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Assessing international accounting harmonization in Latin America 
 
ABSTRACT 
We draw on institutional theory and interviews with key informants to assess 
international accounting harmonization in the 13 countries of the Group of Latin 
American Accounting Standards Setters (GLASS). Some GLASS countries have 
effected full formal adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
but in others, IFRS are not permitted. In several GLASS countries, IFRS are 
supplemented by national standards for micro-entities and cooperatives. We 
conclude that it will be difficult to achieve material harmonization in GLASS countries 
due to a lack of trained accountants, unreliable enforcement systems, and competing 
institutional logics of taxation systems, banks and insurance companies. 
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1. Introduction 
We compare the process of adopting (and/or converging with) International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS)1 by countries in Latin America. Our focus is on the countries that 
compose the Group of Latin American Accounting Standards Setters (GLASS). This organization 
was formed in 2011. The interviews conducted for the present study were undertaken in 2013, 
when GLASS comprised 12 countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela). Guatemala had observer status at 
that time and its representative was also interviewed. Subsequently, Guatemala became a full 
member, as did Costa Rica and Honduras. 
There is little published research on accounting in the GLASS countries. Indeed, little is 
known outside each national setting of the process of adoption or convergence with IFRS in 
Latin America. Generally, we seek to extend knowledge on this matter by addressing the 
following four sets of specific research questions: 
1. How and why was GLASS formed? Who was the institutional entrepreneur? 
2. How can the current stage of IFRS adoption or convergence in each GLASS member 
country be characterized? Using a conceptual framework based on institutional 
theory, how can accounting harmonization be explained? What agreements between 
competing viewpoints have been achieved?  
3. Were the adoption and convergence processes isomorphic? Which institutional logics 
were central in these processes? 
4. Does the degree of adoption or convergence depend on whether knowledge 
discourses about IFRS become power? Who were the institutional actors? What are 
the main sources of resistance? 
 
We interviewed the official representative of each of the 13 GLASS countries in 
September 2013. To increase reliability, the interview data are triangulated with other 
evidence (such as archival documents and website information). We explore the process of 
international adoption or convergence from an institutional perspective. Our intent is to 
                                                          
1 This acronym also refers to accounting standards issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB). 
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understand how accounting influences, and is influenced by, multiple agents, institutions, and 
processes (Miller, 1994; Miller and Napier, 1993). We invoke institutional theory because we 
are attracted to its arguments that efficiency is not sufficient to explain changes in accounting 
practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott and Meyer, 1991; Rodrigues and Craig, 2007) and 
that organizations (or in this case countries) adhere to external rules, norms and belief systems 
to garner legitimacy and an aura of rationality and efficiency (Carpenter and Feroz, 1992).  
Our macro-institutional analysis occurs at the organizational field level (Dillard et al., 
2014) to enhance understanding of agreements that have been achieved in GLASS countries. 
Some GLASS countries have effected full formal harmonization with IFRS, while in others, IFRS 
are not permitted, but are only used by a limited number of companies in preparing 
consolidated accounts. We reveal that material harmonization, as opposed to formal 
harmonization (Fontes et al., 2005), will be difficult to achieve in coming years because of a 
lack of trained professional accountants and reliable enforcement systems. Using an 
institutional perspective and the theoretical framework of Rodrigues and Craig (2007), we find 
that GLASS countries are at different stages of the adoption/convergence process.  
In several countries, in addition to full IFRS and the IFRS for Small and Medium-sized 
Entities (SMEs), other national standards have been issued for micro-entities and cooperatives. 
Thus, in national contexts where these types of entities are important, local standards are 
being issued. Such practice diverges from the institutional logic regarding the appropriateness 
of standards issued by the IASB for any entity, in different parts of the world. We also find that 
competitive institutional logics related to taxation systems, and the banking and insurance 
industries, are important influences in some countries, and that they are delaying the 
adoption/convergence process. 
The next section presents a literature review in two sections: a review of aspects of 
accounting harmonization globally and in Latin America; and a theoretical framework based on 
institutional theory. Next, we present the research method and results, before entering 
conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Financial reporting harmonization globally and in Latin America 
Because institutional contexts differ, it is difficult to accommodate accounting diversity 
and achieve international accounting harmonization. Environmental factors vary widely 
globally, but play an important role in explaining accounting practices (Radebaugh et al., 2006). 
The imposition of Anglo-Saxon accounting models on nations with different levels of 
development and different economic, social, political and cultural context, has been criticized. 
However, arguments against harmonization were weakened when the IASB began to gain 
enhanced legitimacy in the mid-1990s. The process of accounting harmonization began to 
develop more vigorously as regional and national accounting standards setters, and Big 4 audit 
firms, began to support the IASB more strongly.  
The success of IFRS is attributed to its principles-based standards (Carmona and 
Trombetta, 2008). This feature gives IFRS flexibility and helps them adapt to different 
institutional contexts and accounting traditions. Despite widespread international adoption of 
IFRS, there are conflicting opinions about the ensuing quality of financial reporting. Carmona 
and Trombetta (2008, p. 458) contend that quality depends on whether the adoption is serious 
or countries are “label adopters”: that is, they seek the reputational cachet of IFRS, but do not 
innately and fully commit to them. Thus, some companies take advantage of the flexibility of 
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IASB standards to maintain the previous national regulation, but are classified nonetheless as 
using international standards (Guerreiro et al., 2015). 
One of the few studies of accounting practice in Latin America (by Sarquis et al., 2014) 
reported on accounting systems in Argentina, Brazil, Chile Mexico and Peru – all countries that 
had adopted IFRS. They concluded that despite efforts to adopt or to converge with IFRS, there 
were significant differences in the way IFRS were applied, resulting in “national IFRS 
standards.” Sarquis et al. (2014) concluded that the traditional dichotomy between Anglo-
Saxon and Continental European countries remained, even after the adoption of IFRS.  
Several studies have analyzed earnings management practices in Latin America. Rathke 
and Santana (2015), for example, studied whether earnings management by listed companies 
in Brazil, Chile and Peru increased or decreased after the adoption of IFRS. They concluded 
that accounts manipulation was reduced, financial information was more homogeneous, 
earnings management was reduced, and the quality of financial information was improved. 
Rodríguez García et al. (2017) analyzed 923 listed companies from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico. They concluded that between 2000 and 2014, change from local accounting 
regulations to IFRS increased value relevance and earnings timeliness in large firms. Silva et al. 
(2015) concluded that the adoption of IFRS in Brazil and Chile between 2004 and 2012 reduced 
earnings management, although the effect was only significant for Chilean companies. In view 
of the above, the general effect of IFRS adoption on listed companies seems to have been 
positive. 
 
2.2. Theoretical framework  
The theoretical framework of Rodrigues and Craig (2007) is used for interpretative 
purposes, together with the concepts of institutional logics (Anglo-Saxon versus Latin 
accounting standards) and institutional entrepreneurship (who initiated GLASS and pushed for 
change from local standards to international standards in each country?). We have changed 
the framework used by Rodrigues and Craig (2007) by replacing the dialectical process of 
thesis, antithesis and synthesis with the concept of institutional logics. We argue that to 
understand the process of international accounting harmonization, four circumstances should 
be considered. 
 
1. Convergence of accounting standards depends on achieving agreements between 
competing institutional logics.  
Guerreiro et al. (2012a) argue that institutional logics associated with the use of IFRS 
enable and constrain organizational decisions regarding generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). Institutional logics are ‘‘the socially constructed, historical patterns of 
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules by which individuals produce and 
reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their 
social reality’’ (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 804). Rodrigues and Craig (2007) identified several 
sources of beliefs associated with the adoption of IFRS. These included the need to increase 
the efficiency of capital markets, improve the comparability of financial information, and 
reduce capital costs. Harmonization through adoption of IFRS has multiple advantages for 
multinational corporations and capital market regulators: cost reduction, improved 
understanding, credibility and comparability of financial information, and the offering of an 
alternative to standards set by the US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).  
But society is conceptualized as a potentially contradictory inter-institutional system in 
which each sector represents a different set of expectations of social behaviour (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991). Fields are comprised of multiple logics, and by debate about which practices are 
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appropriate (Lounsbury, 2007; 2008). Beliefs associated with maintaining national accounting 
standards are that they are adapted to the national environmental context and privilege the 
most important users in the country (creditors and the tax system) and not secondary users 
(underdeveloped capital markets in some countries). Standards used in advanced economies 
do not axiomatically serve less developed countries well. They are prone to impose an Anglo-
American hegemony. 
Change is explained by differences in cognitive orientation and by debate about which 
practices are appropriate (Lounsbury, 2007, 2008; Guerreiro et al., 2012a). Each institutional 
logic offers multiple sources of rationality (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008).  
The creation and adoption of IFRS is based on prevailing institutional logics in which the 
interests, identities, values and assumptions of individuals and organizations are embedded 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Guerreiro et al., 2012a). Thus, in analysing the creation of GLASS 
and the adoption of IFRS in GLASS countries, we consider the institutional logics involved. In 
doing so, we incorporate the role of broader belief systems into our examination of the 
willingness of countries to conform to institutional pressures. In institutional theory, 
organizational fields are comprised of multiple logics. Practice variation is explained by 
differences in cognitive orientation and by debate about which practices are appropriate 
(Lounsbury, 2007; 2008). In explaining the adoption/convergence process in GLASS countries, 
we are alert to the heterogeneity in accounting practices and the agency that arises from 
contradictions between the logics of different institutional orders that provide multiple 
sources of rationality (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Guerreiro et al., 2012a). Governments, 
accounting standards setters, and associations of accountants, have their own lower-order 
logics. These are nested in society-level logics. Lower-order logics such as common-law (IFRS) 
versus code-law logics (national accounting and taxation standards) help to prescribe local 
accounting practices and understand the agreements we analyse. 
Thus, the degree of adoption (or convergence) by GLASS countries should be consistent 
with the competing institutional logics of each country. The adoption/convergence process 
should vary between “full and immediate adoption of IFRS; full adoption of IFRS with time lags; 
selective adoption of IFRS; and the development of national standards based on IFRS” 
(Rodrigues & Craig, 2007, p. 753). 
 
2. Adoption and convergence of accounting standards is a process of isomorphism that 
works well when institutions and environments are similar 
 
IFRS can be legally enforced by regulatory agencies in different countries. This is coercive 
isomorphism. Normative isomorphism can be seen in the rhetoric of large international 
accounting firms who advise their company clients to adopt IFRS; in the teaching of IFRS at 
universities; and in the rhetoric of national and global professional accounting associations in 
supporting adoption of IFRS. Several companies have adopted IFRS voluntarily for competitive 
reasons and to attain legitimacy (Guerreiro et al., 2012a; 2012b). This is mimetic isomorphism. 
However, high quality isomorphism will only be possible if institutions and contexts are similar 
(Rodrigues & Craig, 2007). Although all GLASS countries can be classified as Latin, the cultures, 
social contexts and social understandings of rationality differ between them.  
 
3. Convergence in different environmental contexts is likely to be affected by decoupling 
The more diversified the environment where companies are located, the more likely they 
are to operate differently, and for financial reporting standards to apply differently (Zeff, 
2007). Decoupling, or idiosyncratic national interpretations, should be observable. These arise 
5 
 
from institutional pressures to adopt international accounting standards that differ from 
national standards. Decoupling can arise too from cultural barriers in understanding the Anglo-
American accounting model; difficulties in conveying intended meaning in translating of 
standards; poorly prepared professional accountants; and the complexity of implementing 
IFRS. Thus, although companies can argue that they are applying IFRS, full compliance may not 
be achieved. 
 
4. The degree of convergence will depend on whether knowledge of the discourse of IFRS by 
institutional entrepreneurs becomes power 
The institutionalization of supranational accounting standards is a deeply political activity, 
reflecting the relative power of organized interests and actors (Dillard et al., 2004). Adoption 
and convergence (or isomorphism) with IFRS should occur if institutions believe that 
convergence offers the best course of action and is conceived as right and normal. These 
discourses are used by institutional entrepreneurs: that is, by organized actors with the 
interests, and resources to create new institutions or transform existing institutions (Maguire 
et al., 2004). Battilana et al. (2009) specified that institutional entrepreneurs must initiate 
divergent changes that break with institutionalized models and institutional logics in a given 
context; and that they must mobilize resources to implement these changes – thus 
contributing to the institutionalization of alternative practices.  
Three activities to effect change are first, to develop a shared vision and power-
knowledge discourse (which involves theorizing the institutional design to take into account 
the interests, values, and problems of potential allies); second, to mobilize people to support 
and accept new routines; and third, to motivate others to achieve and sustain the accounting 
change. 
 
3. Research method 
To understand the institutional dynamics associated with the adoption of, or convergence 
with, IFRS in GLASS countries, we conducted semi-structured interviews with the national 
representative of each of the 13 GLASS countries, in September 2013. We used key informant 
interviews because they are an effective way of gaining deeper knowledge of the group 
processes and perspectives of different actors (Patton, 2002; Guerreiro et al., 2015). Key 
informant interviews are qualitative in-depth interviews that permit collection of information 
from a wide range of people who have first-hand knowledge of the accounting community. 
The interviews were conducted and transcribed in the native language of the key informants 
(Spanish or Portuguese). Each interviewee received their interview transcript to check for 
possible mistakes or misinterpretations. When an interviewee’s answers were less clear, 
additional clarifications were requested. The duration of each interview was between 30 and 
90 minutes. 
Information pertaining to the organizations represented by each interviewee was 
collected in advance to increase interviewer credibility and win the confidence of key 
informants. A list of interview topics was sent to key informants in advance to enable them to 
begin preparing their responses, and if necessary, to discuss the topic with the accounting 
association they represent in GLASS. We agreed to disclose only the key informants’ positions 
in GLASS, and the name of the professional associations to which they belonged. Interview 
data were coded according to a scheme developed in concert with the theoretical framework. 
Table 1 shows the key informants’ positions in GLASS and the respective accounting bodies 
they represented.  
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Table 1  
Key informant details 
 
  
Position Country 
Vice-President of GLASS, Director of the Argentine Association of Accountants, Economists, 
Managers and Actuaries 
Argentina 
Director of GLASS, President of the Mexican Accounting Standards Board Mexico 
Member of GLASS, Director of the Accounting Standards Board of Peru Equator 
Director of GLASS, President of the Colombian Accounting Standards Board Colombia 
Director of GLASS, Director of the Association of Accountants Economists and Managers of Uruguay  Uruguay 
Member of GLASS, Vice-President of the Brazil Federal Council of Accounting  Brazil 
Member of GLASS, Director of the Association of Accountants of Chile  Chile 
Member of GLASS, Director of the Association of Auditors and Certified Accountants of Bolivia  Bolivia 
Member of GLASS, President of the Institute of Certified Accountants and Auditors of Guatemala  Guatemala 
Member of GLASS, Director of the Accounting Standards Board of Panama  Panama 
Member of GLASS, Director of the Association of Accountants of El Salvador  El Salvador 
Member of GLASS, Director of the Accounting Standards Board of Peru Peru 
Director of GLASS, Director of the Federation of Colleges of Public Accountants of Venezuela  Venezuela 
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When GLASS was formed, the national representatives on GLASS represented the body in 
their country that issued financial reporting standards. If such a body did not exist, the 
representative was a member of a professional body that formally issued financial reporting 
standards and was also a member of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) (as 
was the case with Brazil and Chile). If the previously mentioned bodies did not exist (or they 
did not agree to join GLASS), the country’s professional accounting body that was a member of 
IFAC became a member of GLASS. 2 
To overcome the limitations of single source information, and to increase reliability and 
validity, interviews were complemented with documentary evidence. Such a combination of 
data sources increases the robustness of conclusions (Patton, 2002). The documentary 
evidence consists of reports published by professional bodies in GLASS countries; documents 
disclosed on web sites (including the websites of GLASS3, and the IFRS Foundation4), laws and 
legislation. These additional sources increase the internal and contextual validity of the data 
(Ryan et al., 2002) and the research quality. This process led to construction of tables that 
classified the subjects and topics addressed most frequently by the respondents. Relationships 
between themes were established through a close reading of data and documents that was 
articulated with the theoretical approach adopted. Particular attention was paid to the extent 
to which respondents accepted, or challenged, the adoption of IFRS. 
 
4. Results 
Below we analyse the interview data and the documentary evidence gathered, for each 
set of research questions.  
1. How and why was GLASS created? Who was the entrepreneur? 
In February 2011, the Brazilian accountants association, the Federal Council of Accounting 
(CFC), held a seminar on the “State of the IFRS Convergence Process in Latin American 
Countries” in Brasilia. Other countries represented were Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela and 
Uruguay. The [then] president of the IASB, Sir David Tweedie, also attended. This was the first 
formally convened meeting to discuss the constitution of GLASS. Each country reported on the 
status of its adoption of IFRS. The meeting discussed the ways GLASS could contribute to 
develop various accounting themes proposed by the IASB. Tweedie reported that many 
countries now communicated with the IASB through regional blocks, such as the European 
Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), Asian-Oceanian Standard-Setters Group (AOSSG), 
and the Pan African Federation of Accountants (PAFA). Because these regional blocks 
facilitated communication and consensus on accounting issues, the IASB suggested that a 
regional group be created to represent Latin American countries in the IASB. This idea was 
based on the premise that countries with similar cultural contexts would have similar issues to 
address in adopting IFRS. 
In 2011, the CFC convened two meetings in Brasilia and two meetings in Buenos Aires to 
develop the constitution of GLASS. On 28 June 2011, during the “Accounting and 
Accountability for Regional Economic Growth” conference in Buenos Aires, the statutes of 
                                                          
2http://media.ifrs.org/2014/Trustees/October/GLASS%20Presentation%20English%202014.pdf, 
accessed 3 December 2016. 
 
3 http://glenif.org/es/, accessed 20 November 2016. 
 
4 http://www.ifrs.org/Use-around-the-world/Documents/Jurisdiction-profiles, accessed 20 December 
2016. 
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GLASS were signed. Four directors were elected (the representatives of Mexico, Uruguay, Chile 
and Venezuela), together with a Vice-President (an Argentinian), and a President (a Brazilian).  
The creation of GLASS was a strong normative initiative of the IASB, acting as an 
institutional entrepreneur (Battilana et al., 2009; Battilana, 2006). GLASS disseminated IASB 
standards and thereby reconciled competing institutional logics. Regional groups such as 
GLASS facilitated the process of changing local standards to international standards, thereby 
increasing normative isomorphism and power-knowledge discourses in support of IFRS. 
Divergent change was also driven by dominant actors in mature fields when some established 
practices and forms of action (local standards) were questioned. In this case, dormant 
institutions (local standards) changed to international standards (Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2006). The IASB’s support of GLASS was influenced by its perception that Latin America 
comprised fragmented institutional environments and multiple logics. This encouraged the 
IASB to act as an institutional entrepreneur to effect change from national standards to IFRS. 
Actors associated with the accounting profession in Brazil and Argentina were involved 
strongly in creating GLASS as a regional accounting standardization body. GLASS offered an 
easier way of communicating knowledge of IFRS, using a network of professionals who would 
also help to disseminate IFRS. It also provided a technical regulatory forum in which IFRS could 
be discussed. 
The creation of GLASS can also be conceived as mimetic isomorphism. Prior to its 
formation, similar bodies existed in Europe and elsewhere. By establishing GLASS, Latin 
America was creating a type of organization that had been considered successful and 
legitimate in other parts of the world (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Thus, the establishment of 
GLASS permitted “regional harmonization of accounting standards ...with institutions like the 
IASB serving as a guiding mechanism or clearing house” (Rodrigues & Craig, 2007, p. 750). 
However, GLASS was a late adopter – a timing that can be explained principally for reasons of 
legitimacy-seeking rather than efficiency (Dillard et al., 2004). 
 
2. How can the current stage of IFRS adoption or convergence in each GLASS member country 
be characterized? Using a conceptual framework based on institutional theory, how can 
accounting harmonization be explained? What agreements between competing points have 
been achieved?  
 
The situation in each GLASS country is summarized in Table 2 and described below. 
Argentina: The National Securities Commission (CNV) required all companies (other than banks 
or insurance companies) whose securities are publicly traded, and which are regulated by the 
CNV, to prepare consolidated and separated financial statements using IFRS. The use of IFRS 
for local statutory purposes by unlisted companies is determined by each province’s Registry 
of Commerce.5 When the IFRS for SMEs is not permitted, companies are expected to use 
Argentinian standards. Argentina is converging Argentinian GAAP with IFRS. The Argentinian 
representative considered the completion of a set of professional accounting rules that were 
harmonized with the international accounting standards proposed by the IASB to be an urgent 
priority. The Accounting Standard 24 (RT 24) “Particular aspects of accounting and audit for 
cooperative entities” was issued in 2008.6 
                                                          
5 Argentina has 23 provinces and one equivalent province (the autonomous city of Buenos Aires). 
 
6 http://www.cpcesfe1.org.ar/resol-CS/RT24%20NormContcooperat%20JGmarzo08%20pararesol.pdf, 
accessed 3 January 2017. 
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Bolivia: The National Technical Board of Auditors and Accountants had planned the adoption 
of IFRS since 2009. However, implementation was reported as awaiting approval by the 
government regulatory body that approves accounting standards (Ministry of Development 
and Economic Growth). Only a few companies had adopted IFRS voluntarily. Currently, all 
companies in Bolivia, whether domestic or foreign, must follow Bolivian Accounting Standards 
in preparing statutory financial statements. Subsidiaries of foreign companies (whether 
Bolivian or foreign companies themselves) are permitted to use IFRS for consolidation 
purposes (but not in their separate company financial statements).  
Bolivia has no general plan for the diffusion of IFRS. Few professional accountants have 
adopted IFRS. The convergence process in Bolivia received a boost in January 2007 with the 
support of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (Project ATN/MT-10078-BO: 
Convergence with International Accounting Standards and Audit). The key informant from 
Bolivia indicated that “government authorities have not agreed, and so the 14 Bolivian 
accounting standards continue to be followed, with IFRS applied only on a supplementary 
basis.” 
 
Brazil: Full IFRS are required for the consolidated financial statements of listed companies for 
financial years ending on or after 31 December 2010. Separate financial statements of listed 
companies follow Brazilian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (BR GAAP). Since 2010, all 
Brazilian Accounting Standards have converged with IFRS. For unlisted companies for financial 
reporting years ending on or after 31 December 2010, financial statements must be prepared 
in accord with BR GAAP. However, unlisted companies are permitted to adopt IFRS for their 
consolidated financial statements.  
Although SMEs are required to apply the Brazilian equivalent of the IFRS for SMEs, they 
can opt to apply full BR GAAP. Since 2010, listed financial institutions, or unlisted financial 
institutions that are required to have an audit committee regulated by the Brazilian Central 
Bank (BACEN), have been required to prepare consolidated financial statements in accord with 
IFRS, as supplemental information. Statutory accounts are required to follow accounting 
practices adopted by the Brazilian Central Bank. Insurance companies have been required to 
prepare consolidated financial statements using IFRS since 2010. From 1 January 2011, for 
their individual (separate company) financial statements, insurance companies have adopted 
BR GAAP. Micro-entities use a simplified set of national accounting standards established 
under a local standard issued by the accountants’ association (Resolution CFC 1418/2012). 
 
Chile: On 31 December 2009, major public companies registered with the Superintendence of 
Securities and Insurance were required to use IFRS. Some companies were allowed to defer 
adopting IFRS until 2010. Banks and other financial institutions were required to follow 
accounting rules issued by the Superintendence of Banks and Financial Institutions. This body 
adopted IFRS from 31 December 2009, with modifications (e.g., not permitting fair value). 
Effective in 2013, Chile adopted the IFRS for SMEs. Support of the IDB was important for the 
adoption process. 
 
Colombia: Three requirements of Law 1314 of 13 July 2009 are outlined below: 
  1. In 2015 (transition date 2014), full IFRS were to be adopted by all companies whose 
securities are publicly traded and are legally defined as public interest entities under the law; 
by large companies whose parent or subsidiary reports under IFRS; and companies whose 
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revenue is derived 50% or more from exports or imports. These companies had an option to 
adopt IFRS earlier, beginning in 2013.  
2. In 2016, the IFRS for SMEs standard was to be adopted by large and medium-sized 
companies other than those included in group 1 above.  
3. In 2015, micro-entities were required to adopt a new standard developed for micro 
entities in Colombia by the Technical Council for Public Accounting. Micro entities could 
choose the IFRS for SMEs.  
Another agreement between competing points was achieved: companies regulated by the 
National General Accounting Office (because the Colombian Federal Government has an 
ownership stake) are required to apply IFRS in accord with a new regulatory framework that 
was issued by Columbia’s General Accounting Office in 2014.  
 
Ecuador: Since 1 January 2010, all listed companies and all other companies required by law to 
have an external audit, have been required to use IFRS. Since 1 January 2011, IFRS have been 
required by all companies with assets greater than US$ 4,000,000 at 31 December 2007; 
holding companies and consolidated groups; state-owned entities; and foreign-invested 
entities. Since 1 January 2012, all other companies have been required to use IFRS. An 
exception is allowed for companies with total annual sales less than US$ 5,000,000; and total 
assets less than US$ 4,000,000, and fewer than 200 employees (annual weighted average). 
These companies may use the IFRS for SMEs. Banks, insurance companies, and other financial 
institutions under the supervision of the Superintendence of Banks and Insurance Companies 
must use standards issued by that regulator. 
 
El Salvador: In 2011, the Supervisory Board of the Profession of Public Accounting and Auditing 
decreed that IFRS be adopted by companies listed on the El Salvador Stock Exchange. The IFRS 
for SMEs was to be used by all other companies. The decree did not apply to banks, insurance 
companies, and pension funds which are subject to accounting regulations adopted by their 
respective regulatory agencies. These regulators have not adopted IFRS. They require the 
financial statements of their regulated entities to show the main differences between local 
standards and IFRS. Cooperatives have to comply with a special accounting standard based on 
the IFRS for SMEs. 
 
Guatemala: IFRS were adopted commencing in 2008, and the IFRS for SMEs in 2010. However, 
both are still voluntary since resolutions of the College of Public Accountants and Auditors of 
Guatemala do not have legal force. Companies prefer to prepare financial statements based on 
the tax law (Guatemala Commercial Code Law). However, the tax authority will also accept 
financial statements prepared according to either full IFRS or the IFRS for SMEs. Banks, 
insurance companies, and other regulated financial enterprises are not allowed to present 
their financial statements based on IFRS. Instead, the banking regulator has developed 
national accounting manuals containing some accounting treatments that differ from IFRS. In 
Guatemala, accounting is generally subordinated to taxation.  
 
Mexico: IFRS were adopted by the National Banking and Securities Commission (NBSC) for 
listed companies other than financial institutions and insurance companies, effective for 
annual reporting periods (non-consolidated and consolidated accounts) beginning on or after 1 
January 2012. Early application was allowed from 2008. Companies in the financial and 
insurance sectors follow Mexican Financial Reporting Standards (MFRS), requirements of the 
NBSC, and of the National Insurance and Bonding Commission (CNSF). Additionally, the 
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Mexican Financial Reporting Standards Board (CINIF) has a convergence project to eliminate 
differences between MFRS and IFRS. MFRS are used by most SMEs. CINIF has not adopted the 
IFRS for SMEs. CINIF has identified the main differences between the MFRS and IFRS. Several 
changes to IFRS have been made. 
 
Panama: The Superintendence of Banking (by Agreement 4, 11 May 1999) and the National 
Securities Commission (by Resolution 8, 22 May 2000) require either IFRS or US GAAP to be 
adopted in preparing financial statements for banking entities and companies registered with 
the National Securities Commission. Law 12 (3 April 2012) required all insurance companies to 
use IFRS from 2014. Panama is a case of early full adoption. The Fiscal Code was adjusted in 
2005 (Article 699). Article 14 of Law 57 (the Law of Certified Public Accountants) was also 
changed in 2005 to require use of IFRS. SMEs are permitted, but not required, to use IFRS for 
SME. Alternatively, SMEs may choose IFRS or national accounting standards issued by the 
Accounting Technical Board of the Ministry of Finance. 
 
Peru: Since 1 January 2012, the Peruvian securities market regulator has required all listed 
companies other than financial institutions (banks, insurance companies, pension funds) to 
publish financial statements prepared in conformity with IFRS. In 2013, unlisted larger private 
companies (those with net revenues or assets exceeding approximately US$ 40 million) were 
required by the Accounting Standards Council (CNC) to publish financial statements prepared 
in accord with IFRS. The CNC indicated that the IFRS for SMEs may be applied by Peruvian 
companies with total assets and/or net revenues less than approximately US$4 million. 
Companies applying IFRS must comply with some national legal and tax requirements that 
might be inconsistent with IFRS. These include tax regulations for determining the useful lives 
of depreciable assets and the restatement of financial statements for inflation between 1998 
and 2004. (This is despite the Peruvian economy not qualifying as hyperinflationary under IAS 
29 Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies.) Accounting standards for banks are in 
the process of being converged with IFRS.  
 
Uruguay: In July 2007, the government decreed that IFRS would be mandatory for all 
companies other than banks and financial institutions for financial years beginning on or after 
1 January 2009. However, adoption was not full, since three major changes were introduced. 
First, companies must follow national standards for the presentation of financial statements 
and note disclosures that differ from IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements. Second, 
general price-level adjusted financial statements were required even if the hyperinflation test 
of 100% over three years (IAS 29 Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies) is not 
met. Third, investments must be accounted for by the equity method in separate financial 
statements. (This differs from the requirement in IAS 27 Separate Financial Statements.) 
In April 2011, the government decreed that IFRS should be used in 2012 by non-financial 
institutions whose securities are publicly traded – and by autonomous entities, and 
decentralised service companies. In April 2012, the government decreed that financial 
statements adjusted for changes in the general price-level would not be mandatory after 2011. 
For banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and other financial institutions, the Central 
Bank of Uruguay required unmodified adoption of IFRS, starting in 2014. Decree 291/2014 
required the IFRS for SMEs be applied by SMEs (with modifications, such as revaluation model 
for property, plant and equipment and capitalisation of borrowing costs are permitted) whose 
annual net operating income was less than UR$ 200,000 (approximately US$ 6,300) and for 
whom total indebtedness to entities controlled by the Central Bank of Uruguay was less than 
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5% of net asset value. SMEs meeting these requirements were also permitted to apply full IFRS 
instead of the IFRS for SMEs. The key informant from Uruguay advised that an update of IFRS 
and an accounting standard for micro-entities were under consideration by the government’s 
Standing Committee for Accounting Standards Adaptation. 
 
Venezuela: The 2008 version of IFRS was adopted, but as modified by the Federation of Public 
Accounting Societies of Venezuela. One major modification was that price-level adjusted 
financial statements are required when the rate of inflation is 10% or more. This requirement 
was for all companies whose securities trade in a public market, and for banks and other 
financial institutions. New and amended IFRS since 2008 have not been adopted. SMEs not in 
the oil, energy, and mining industries, were required to use the IFRS for SMEs from 2010 
onwards. The definition of small and large companies has changed over time.  
 
The preceding analysis reveals that countries are at different stages in the process of 
adoption or convergence with IFRS. The date of adoption/convergence differs from country to 
country. In some countries, despite adoption, IFRS are not up to date. In most countries, the 
adoption by financial institutions is problematic. Some countries have needed to create other 
standards, such as of a local accounting standard for micro-entities and an accounting 
standard for cooperatives. When IFRS are permitted (but not required), only a few companies 
adopt them. While some countries adopted IFRS in 2005 (e.g., Panama), others faced powerful 
“tax mentality” logics that prevented them from changing from local standards to IFRS. 
  
13 
 
 
Table 2  
The IFRS adoption and convergence in GLASS countries 
[Abbreviations: Acctg = Accounting; Stds = Standards] 
 
Country Listed 
companies 
Unlisted 
companies 
Banks and 
insurance 
companies 
IFRS for 
SMEs 
Micro-
entities 
standard 
Cooperatives 
standard 
Argentina IFRS  IFRS converged 
with Argentine 
GAAP. Full IFRS 
and IFRS for 
SMEs 
permitted. 
Regulations 
enforced by 
Central Bank of 
Argentina and by 
Superintendence 
of Insurance. IFRS 
not permitted. 
No No Acctg Std 24: 
Particular aspects 
of acctg and audit 
for cooperative 
entities 
Bolivia Bolivian Acctg 
Stds* 
Bolivian Acctg 
Stds*  
Bolivian Acctg 
Stds* 
No No No 
Brazil IFRS required 
in 
consolidated 
accounts. 
Brazilian stds 
converged 
with IFRS 
required in 
separate 
accounts 
Brazilian stds 
converged with 
IFRS 
Listed and large 
unlisted banks 
and insurance 
companies 
required to 
prepare 
consolidated 
financial 
statements in 
accord with IFRS 
as supplemental 
information. 
Statutory 
accounts to 
follow acctg stds 
of Brazilian 
Central Bank. 
Modified IFRS 
for SMEs 
Yes. A 
simplified set 
of acctg stds 
established 
by Resolution 
CFC 
1418/2012  
NBC T 10 – 
Particular acctg 
topics of specific 
entities,  
NBC T 10.8 – 
Cooperative 
entities 
Chile Full IFRS Full IFRS Full IFRS with 
adaptations** 
IFRS for SMEs 
permitted 
No No 
Colombia Full IFRS Full IFRS Full IFRS  IFRS for SMEs  Financial 
acctg stds for 
micro entities 
in 2015 (local 
standard) 
No 
Ecuador Full IFRS  Full IFRS  Stds issued by the 
Superintendence 
of Banks and 
Insurance 
Companies 
IFRS for SMEs 
permitted 
No No 
El Salvador Full IFRS  IFRS for SMEs Stds issued by 
regulators, 
disclosing the 
main differences 
from IFRS 
IFRS for SMEs 
permitted 
No Yes, based on IFRS 
for SMEs 
(“Financial and 
Reporting Std for 
Cooperative 
Associations of El 
Salvador”) 
Guatemala Stds based on 
Guatemala 
Stds based on 
Guatemala 
Acctg stds issued 
by regulators. 
IFRS for SMEs 
permitted 
No No 
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Commercial 
Code Law. IFRS 
permitted 
Commercial 
Code Law. IFRS 
permitted 
México IFRS for 
consolidated 
and separate 
accounts 
(other than for 
financial 
institutions) 
Converged 
Mexican 
Financial 
Reporting Stds. 
IFRS permitted 
Mexican Financial 
Reporting Stds 
plus other 
requirements 
established by 
regulators 
Mexican 
Financial 
Reporting 
Stds. 
IFRS for SMEs 
permitted 
No No 
Panama IFRS or USA 
GAAP 
IFRS IFRS or USA GAAP 
required for 
consolidated 
accounts. For 
non-consolidated 
accounts IFRS 
modified by 
banking 
prudential rules, 
for regulatory 
purposes  
IFRS for SMEs 
permitted 
No No 
Peru IFRS except  
for financial 
institutions 
Large 
companies are 
required to use 
IFRS 
Acctg stds issued 
by the 
Superintendence 
of Banking, 
Insurance and 
Pension Fund 
Administrators  
IFRS for SMEs 
required 
No No 
Uruguay Full IFRS in 
consolidated 
accounts. 
Converged 
national acctg 
stds for 
separate 
accounts 
Converged 
national acctg 
stds  
Full IFRS  IFRS ( of July 
2007) with 
modifications 
No, but being 
considered 
No, but being 
considered 
Venezuela IFRS (2008 
version) with 
modifications  
IFRS (2008 
version) with 
modifications  
IFRS (2008 
version) with 
modifications 
IFRS for 
SMEs, other 
than SMEs in 
oil, energy 
and mining 
Industries 
who are 
required to 
use full IFRS 
No No 
*Foreign companies and Bolivian national companies that are subsidiaries of foreign companies are permitted to use IFRS for consolidation. 
 
** The main adaptations are that banks must measure loan loss provisions using an expected loss approach and are prohibited from using the 
fair value option. 
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Despite a collective policy of GLASS support for IFRS, there was a divergent reality: IFRS 
were not adopted in Bolivia and Guatemala. In the latter countries, international standards can 
only be adopted voluntarily and in a subsidiary manner. Local standards are maintained and 
IFRS are used only by a few companies. In El Salvador a reconciliation of the type suggested by 
Rodrigues and Craig (2007) can be observed: banks use national standards but highlight the 
main differences from IFRS through supplementary disclosures.  
Institutional logics comprise a highly contingent set of social norms that drive behaviour 
through a logic of appropriateness. In most GLASS countries, full IFRS serve listed companies 
well (particularly in consolidated accounts). Unlisted companies use national standards or 
converged standards (e.g., in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala, México and Uruguay). 
Several countries have adopted the IFRS for SMEs, while others have developed an additional 
local standard for micro-entities or a standard for cooperatives. Thus, to reconcile adoption 
with non-adoption, local standards appeared. 
While some countries have adopted IFRS, others have preferred to converge and adapt 
IFRS to their national context (Brazil, Mexico and Argentina). Other countries have neither 
adopted nor converged (Bolivia and Guatemala). The adoption of IFRS is supported by the idea 
that IFRS provide comparability in financial information; and that countries without national 
accounting standards setting bodies can benefit from the adoption of standards that are ready 
for use (Whittington, 2005). The fact that GLASS now has a role in discussion about 
international accounting standards leads to belief that it is unnecessary to change accounting 
standards (as argued by the representative from Uruguay). The non-adoption or convergence 
is supported by belief that accounting is socially-constructed and that when companies are 
local, accounting standards must be adjusted to the local context. (The representatives of 
Argentina, Mexico and Brazil advocated convergence to suit different jurisdictions). In large 
countries with a powerful accounting profession, there was a process of convergence of local 
standards with IFRS. Such convergence results from a reconciliation between competitive 
logics (the need to adopt the best common-law accounting practices) and (the need to keep 
practices adjusted to the social context and code-law requirements). 
Generally, large countries have more resources to effect convergence with IFRS. Despite 
adopting IFRS unchanged, some countries believe that they should have made some changes 
(e.g., Peru). Thus, the full adoption solution may not be associated with any conviction that the 
standards do not need adaptation, but from the absence of professional resources to do so. 
 
3. Were the adoption and convergence processes isomorphic? Which institutional logics were 
central in these processes? 
When only IFRS are permitted (but not required), only a few companies use them. 
Requirements to use IFRS constitutes a form of coercive isomorphism that is often effected by 
law or capital markets regulations. Organizations that represent major global institutional 
forces providing financial support (e.g., World Bank, International Monetary Fund) are sources 
of coercive isomorphism too.7 Coercive pressures from the IDB were important in GLASS 
countries where the accounting profession is less developed. In Bolivia, despite the support of 
the IDB in 2007, convergence or adoption has not yet occurred because of opposition from 
Government entities, particularly the National Tax Service. A similar institutional logic related 
                                                          
7 Irvine (2008) concluded that the World Bank was an important source of coercive isomorphism in the 
United Arab Emirates. 
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to taxation prevails in Guatemala. Thus, as Thornton and Ocasio point out (1999; 2008), 
historical patterns of cultural symbols, and assumptions, values and beliefs through which 
individuals and organizations give meaning to their daily activities, are shaping actions and 
preventing change. In Bolivia, different institutional logics have nested within higher social 
institutions (Thornton, 2002; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007) that offer resistance to change and 
prevent coercive isomorphism of the IDB from succeeding. In Guatemala, tax-related 
instrumental logics are causing companies to follow Guatemalan standards based on tax 
legislation. Thus, although institutional actors associated with the accounting profession 
support the logic of IFRS, local competitive tax-related logics appear to be stronger. Even 
though Bolivia and Guatemala are GLASS members, the lack of a strong institutional 
entrepreneur to lead the process nationally is slowing the adoption of IFRS. In other countries 
supported by the IDB, coercive isomorphism has been successful (e.g. Chile and Uruguay). In 
these cases, the dominant institutional logic has converged to the view that IFRS were 
important for free trade agreements. According to a key informant, the process of adopting 
IFRS is also regarded as likely to strengthen the accounting profession. 
In many countries, the institutional logic of the financial sector is delaying full adoption of 
IFRS for banks and insurance companies (Argentina, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru). 
This is principally due to perceived problems with implementing fair value accounting by 
financial institutions. Thus, there are multiple sources of rationality. This reinforces the 
potential for any context to be influenced by competing and alternative logics (Scott et al., 
2000). Although actors in the accounting profession seek power and economic advantage 
through the adoption of IFRS, the means and ends to achieve this outcome are constrained by 
other factors and existing institutional logics (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012). 
The adoption of/convergence with IFRS is associated with the level of professional 
technical education (Guler et al., 2002; Hassan, 2008), the support of multinationals in the 
training process, and the role of higher education (normative pressures). While support from 
multinationals has occurred in almost all GLASS countries, the role of universities in supporting 
change varies greatly from country to country. According to some key informants, universities 
are delaying the process of change because the teaching of IFRS is far from widespread. In 
Brazil, although some universities teach IFRS, the key informant argued that Brazil has more 
than 1000 Higher Education Institutions, and the quality and curricula of institutions is 
disparate. International auditing firms have engaged heavily in normative isomorphism to 
promote adoption and convergence processes (Irvine, 2008).  
A scarcity of professional accountants trained in IFRS has impeded material harmonization 
— as too has the lack of strong enforcement systems. In general, enforcement of standards in 
GLASS countries is achieved only through auditing procedures, stock exchange regulations, and 
professional association edicts. There is no system of fines for non-compliance. Knowing that 
audits in most countries are limited to large companies, and that the number of listed 
companies in Latin America is small, means control of the application of standards is limited. 
This is the case of Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela. Most key 
informants pointed out that professional associations and auditors do not have the capacity to 
monitor application of standards (e.g., in Brazil and Chile). In Peru, audit firms do not control 
compliance with IFRS. In Guatemala, Uruguay and Venezuela there is no enforcement system. 
In Peru, only the Securities Market Superintendence has established sanctions for non-
compliance. In Bolivia (which has not yet adopted IFRS), compliance with accounting standards 
is the responsibility of the Authority for the Supervision and Social Control of Companies (part 
of the Ministry of Development and Economic Growth). Ecuador’s enforcement system 
requires financial statements to be sent electronically to the Superintendence of Companies. 
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Inspections are conducted randomly or only after a complaint against a company. A similar 
system exists in El Salvador.  
Organizations adopt new practices for reasons of efficiency and legitimacy (Tolbert & 
Zucker, 1983). If these new practices are inappropriate, and there is no enforcement, a 
mismatch arises between the standards they say they adopt, and the standards they actually 
do adopt (Nor-Aziah, 2007; Rodrigues & Craig, 2007). The key informant from Brazil stated that 
companies were continuing to use Brazilian standards when they were expected to be using 
IFRS. Carvalho (2015) reported that of 120 companies analysed in the period 2008-2013 in 
Maranhão, Brazil, only three had adopted the IFRS for SMEs. This low frequency of adoption 
was due to a pervading “tax mentality.” Such a decoupling is considered a natural rational 
reaction in contexts in which organizations seek legitimacy (Oliver, 1991). Loose coupling 
situations may also occur (Orton & Weick, 1990) when a company responds only to selected 
requirements of international standards (Guerreiro et al., 2015). Given that the business and 
institutional environments of GLASS countries differ considerably from Anglo-Saxon countries, 
companies operate differently. It is important to improve the knowledge accounting 
professionals have of IFRS to increase isomorphism and avoid decoupling (Chand, 2005). In 
countries with weaker or non-existent enforcement systems, adoption may be a mere “label” 
and not a serious adoption (Daske et al., 2007; Carmona & Trombetta, 2008; Guerreiro et al., 
2015). 
In Peru, the adoption of IFRS for SMEs has not been completed efficiently. There has been 
a decoupling because of a lack of resources, a “tax mentality”, and a lack of training in IFRS 
(Nakasone, 2015). Peru has sanctions only for listed companies. Audit firms do not control 
compliance with accounting standards. Therefore, decoupling is unsurprising. 
The deinstitutionalisation of local standards in countries which support adoption of IFRS is 
not evident. There seems to be no consensus among the actors (in particular, related to 
banking, insurance and tax authorities), leading to a lack of institutional coherence (Oliver, 
1992). Only when the institutional logic of IFRS is accepted socially will there be institutional 
change and more widespread adoption of IFRS.  
Thus, the increase of isomorphism in relation to IFRS in the region will depend on the 
ability of the organizational sector to have knowledge-power discourses that influence the 
political-economic sector in the region (Rodrigues & Craig, 2007; Dillard et al., 2004). This will 
help to reduce the “tax mentality”, improve IFRS teaching, and create enforcement systems 
that make the adoption/convergence with IFRS effective. 
 
4. Does the degree of adoption or convergence depend on whether knowledge discourses about 
IFRS became power? Who were the institutional actors? What are the main sources of 
resistance? 
Power-knowledge discourses can change institutional logic that resists the adoption of 
IFRS. This leads to belief that IFRS are neutral regarding tax collection or that the risk of 
financial institutions will not increase by adopting international standards. Power-knowledge 
discourses in favor of IFRS are essential to increase the degree of formal isomorphism in the 
adoption of standards (Rodrigues & Craig, 2007). In Bolivia and Guatemala, institutional actors 
linked to the profession (organizational level) seem unable to make the change on their own, 
but require support of the state (political-economic level). These key informants reported 
regretting that the IASB cannot directly impose IFRS in national contexts. This poses a 
challenge to IFRS Foundation trustees to engage politically with governments: for example, the 
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Brazilian key informant pointed out that they should argue that "Brazil cost"8 would be 
reduced.  
In Brazil, the adoption/convergence of IFRS has provided grounds for the Brazilian 
accounting profession to negotiate successfully for a higher social status with the government. 
Admission to the profession can now only be made by graduates with higher education in 
accounting, ending admission of "accounting technicians." Additionally, they negotiated the 
right to impose a professional entry examination (“Exam of Sufficiency”) and an unequivocal 
right to issue accounting standards. As a consequence of convergence with IFRS, audit fees 
grew 20.71% between 2009 and 2012 in companies listed on Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias e 
Futuros de São Paulo, a stock exchange located at São Paulo, Brazil (Murro et al., 2015). 
The interviews revealed that stronger power-knowledge discourses in favour of IFRS were 
associated with countries which tended to accept the costs of adopting IFRS as irrelevant. 
Several countries favoured adoption of IFRS for efficiency reasons related to reduction of 
standardization costs. Some countries have never had local accounting standards. In other 
countries there were no accounting standards on some matters. The permanent updating of 
IFRS was considered important since it would decrease standardization costs. However, some 
discourses point to the high quality of IFRS and to the perception that adoption of IFRS was a 
sign of modernity in a country because IFRS represent “best accounting practices.” Discourses 
associated with the idea that better accounting standards lead to modernization of the 
accounting profession were also considered important explanations of change (Rodrigues & 
Craig, 2007; Guerreiro et al., 2012a). Some key informants said that adoption was influenced 
by rhetorical discourses that claimed IFRS will lead to improved business activity and 
competitiveness. Other key informants acknowledged the rhetoric associated with the benefits 
of change. For example, the Panamanian key informant argued that accounting cannot change 
a country's economy, since accounting is “always a step beyond economic events.”  
Professional accounting bodies in Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala and Venezuela were 
institutional entrepreneurs. Another major agent of change was government (in Peru and 
Uruguay), often through the stock exchange regulatory body. In Brazil, decisions regarding IFRS 
were imposed by the government through the CVM. In Ecuador, the stock exchange regulator 
was the main entrepreneur. In Colombia, the adoption process was led by the accounting 
profession, supported by the government. In Panama, it was led by audit firms, supported by 
banking law and securities law, which both required use of IFRS. Thus, these institutional 
entrepreneurs are interested in particular institutional arrangements. They mobilize resources 
to create new institutions or transform existing ones (Maguire et al., 2004). Stock exchanges 
wanted efficient and transparent functioning of capital markets. The accounting profession 
aspired to a rise in social status that would accrue from using higher quality and more 
sophisticated standards. Governments believed that modernization of the economy, and 
globalization of companies, depended on the adoption of IFRS (Guerreiro et al., 2015). The IDB, 
through an IMF program, was an important institutional actor. It supported the move to IFRS 
in Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay. Despite the IDB’s resource support, this was insufficient in Bolivia 
for IFRS to be accepted, since support of the tax authority and the government was lacking. So, 
although resources are important in implementing change, it is also important that the state 
enforces standards. 
                                                          
8 “Brazil cost” refers to the increased operating costs associated with doing business in Brazil. Several 
factors contribute to the extra cost: high levels of public deficits, the operation of cartels, inefficient 
public services, high real interest rates, excessive bureaucracy for importers and exporters, low 
education levels, and a lack of qualified labour. 
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The adoption or convergence of IFRS in GLASS countries resulted from discourses of 
institutional entrepreneurs (mainly the accounting profession, state, and stock exchange) 
which controlled the resources needed to make the change (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). 
However, the harmonization process is far from complete. Important obstacles still impair 
genuine comparability. Some of the obstacles “are deeply cultural, while others are susceptible 
to modulation by the principal parties" Zeff (2007, p. 302). Such modulation can occur through 
power-knowledge discourses (Rodrigues & Craig, 2007) and power strategies to influence 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the legitimacy of an IFRS system (Fontes et al., 2016).  
When there is no consensus about a given practice, resistance is expected (Oliver, 1992). 
Because our 13 key informants are from countries that volunteered to form a regional group at 
the suggestion of the IASB, organizational resistance was not expected. However, some 
resistance was observed to the IFRS standard for SMEs because the adoption of this standard 
would lead to revoking national standards. Tax authorities were an obstacle to change in 
countries with a strong link between accounting and taxation, because of strong concerns that 
tax collections would be reduced. In such countries, previous national accounting standards 
were linked closely to taxation. They have been shaped by a different logic – one which poses 
a threat to the adoption of IFRS. In some GLASS countries, the fact that IFRS use the concept of 
fair value, extensively, conflicts with the logic of the finance sector which believes their risk 
exposure will be higher than when using national standards. 
Data at the organizational field level reveal that translation of accounting standards does 
not create difficulties, despite some countries’ use of a localised version of Spanish (e.g., 
Chile). Colombia uses the IASB translation for Spanish, but some words are difficult to 
understand. Accounting professionals with superior technical knowledge have found some 
accounting standards are poorly specified and use vague language. Zeff (2007) reported 
difficulties in interpreting standards, even when they were well translated according to the 
context. For example, Zeff noted cultural differences in the definition of the word "probable" 
in some countries. 
 
5. Discussion 
The regional accounting standardization body, GLASS, was promoted by the institutional 
entrepreneurship of the IASB. The formation of regional groups such as GLASS is intended to 
promote reconciliation regarding accounting standards. GLASS helped to improve the 
convergence process by increasing mimetic and normative isomorphism. 
The GLASS countries are at different stages of development of accounting standards, with 
many competing viewpoints. In Bolivia and Guatemala, IFRS are not permitted but are adopted 
voluntarily by some companies in consolidated accounts. Logics prompted by the 
government’s fear of decreases in tax paid by companies prevented a stronger commitment to 
IFRS. Banks and financial institutions in some GLASS countries have resisted moving to IFRS. 
They are concerned about the technical complexity of standards relating to financial 
instruments, and the effect of widespread adoption of fair value accounting.  
The lack of training for accountants in GLASS countries raises the question of whether 
change will be effective, or whether it will only be cosmetic. Given that the institutional 
context in Latin America differs from the Anglo-Saxon context, decoupling or loose-coupling is 
possible. Without a good system of enforcement there is likely to be a considerable distance 
between formal harmonization and material harmonization (Fontes et al., 2005). Although IFRS 
have been adopted or converged in most GLASS countries with the support of national 
professional and standard setting organizations, companies may not comply, and former 
national models of standard setting seem to be prevailing. The problems of adopting IFRS were 
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identified by key informants as technical complexity, cultural barriers in understanding the 
Anglo-American accounting model, the lack of competent accounting professionals for 
implementation, and the reluctance of some universities to teach IFRS. 
Important logics promoting the adoption of IFRS involved efficiency discourses. These 
included the reduction of consolidation costs and improved comparability (competitive 
isomorphism); and modernization of a country and its economy through higher quality 
standards (legitimacy discourse). Thus, the actors involved undertook change based on 
discourses which developed the idea that IFRS should be implemented to increase efficiency 
and the legitimacy of companies. The main actors undertaking the change were the accounting 
professions, the stock exchanges and the State. Large countries with more resources and a 
better established accounting profession (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) are converging their 
standards with IFRS. Smaller and less well-resourced countries consider that adoption of IFRS 
will provide standards that are ready, of high quality, and conducive to producing uniformity.  
The institutionalization of international accounting standards is a deeply political activity 
that reflects the relative power of organized interests and actors (Dillard et al., 2004). The 
degree of convergence or adoption will depend on the power of the discourse about IFRS. 
Institutional entrepreneurs have to use power-knowledge discourses and resources to support 
this change (DiMaggio, 1988). Thus, the successive agreements between competing viewpoints 
formed over time depend on developing a shared vision, the impact of power-knowledge 
discourses, the capacity to mobilize people and resources to support and accept new routines, 
and the capacity to motivate others to sustain change (Rodrigues & Craig, 2007). 
This paper contributes to the thin volume of literature on the application of IFRS in Latin 
America. In terms of theory development, this paper extends Rodrigues and Craig (2007) by 
incorporating institutional logics and institutional entrepreneurship in an institutional 
framework to explain change and resistance to change. This study highlights the different 
stages of the adoption and convergence with IFRS in GLASS countries, the institutional logics 
associated with change and resistance to change, and the difficulties associated with the 
change process. The institutional entrepreneurs in each country are identified.  
The approach adopted here can be used to explain the institutionalization processes of 
adoption/convergence in other regional accounting standards setting bodies, allowing 
comparisons of the institutional dynamics between different regions. Further research could 
follow the process of international accounting harmonization in Latin America to observe how 
agreements between competing viewpoints change over the time as a consequence of the 
power strategies of organizational actors. Although the process of convergence and adoption 
of IFRS has commenced in many GLASS countries, studies that explore the effective degree of 
compliance with standards are important, since the enforcement systems in GLASS countries 
are weak. Future qualitative studies might follow Guerreiro et al. (2015) in trying to 
understand deeply, for each of the adopter countries analyzed, how IFRS were communicated 
between the political-economic level, organizational field level and organization level. 
 
References 
Battilana, J., 2006. Agency and institutions: the enabling role of individuals social position. 
Organization, 13 (5), 653–676. 
Battilana, J., Leca, B., Boxenbaum, E., 2009. How actors change institutions: Towards a theory 
of institutional entrepreneurship. Academy of Management Annals, 3 (1), 65-107. 
Carmona, S., Trombetta, C., 2008. On the global acceptance of IAS/IFRS accounting standards: 
The logic and implications of the principles-based system. Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy, 27, 455–461. 
21 
 
Carpenter, V., Feroz, E., 1992. GAAP as a symbol of legitimacy: New York state's decision to 
adopt generally accepted accounting principles. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 17 
(7), 613-643. 
Carvalho, J.C.de A., 2015. Difficulties in the adoption of IFRS on small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). In Lourenço, I., Major, M.J., Standardization of Financial Reporting and Accounting 
in Latin American Countries, Chapter 12. Hershey: IGI Global. 
Chand, P., 2005. Impetus to the success of harmonization: the case of South Pacific Islands 
Nations. Critical Perspectives on Accounting. 16 (3), 209–26 
Daske, H., Hail, L., Leuz, C., Verdi, R., 2013. Adopting a label: Heterogeneity in the economic 
consequences around IAS/IFRS adoptions. Journal of Accounting Research, 51, 495–547. 
Dillard, J.F., Rigsby, J.T., Goodman, C., 2004. The making and remaking of organizational 
context: duality and the institutionalization process. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 17, 506-542. 
DiMaggio, P.J., 1988. Interest and agency in institutional theory. In L.J. Zucker (Ed.), 
Institutional patterns and organizations: Culture and environment (pp. 3-21). Cambridge: 
Ballinger. 
DiMaggio, P.J., Powell, W.W., 1983. The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147-160. 
Doupnik, T., Perera, H., 2007. International Accounting. New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
Fontes, A., Rodrigues, L. L., Craig, R., 2016. A theoretical model of stakeholder perceptions of a 
new financial reporting system. Accounting Forum, 40(4), 300-315).  
Fontes, A., Rodrigues, L.L., Craig, R., 2005. Measuring convergence of national accounting 
standards with international financial reporting standards. Accounting Forum, 29 (4), 415-
436.  
Friedland, R., Alford, R.R., 1991. Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices, and institutional 
Contradictions. In Powell W.W., DiMaggio, P.J., (Eds.). The New Institutionalism in 
Organizational Analysis, (pp. 232-266). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Greenwood, R., Suddaby, R. 2006. Institutional entrepreneurship in mature fields: The big five 
accounting firms. Academy of Management Journal, 49, 27–48. 
Guerreiro, M.S., Rodrigues L.L., Craig, R., 2012a. Voluntary adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards by large unlisted companies in Portugal: institutional logics and 
strategic responses. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 37, 482–499. 
Guerreiro, M.S., Rodrigues, L.L., Craig, R., 2012b. Factors influencing the preparedness of large 
unlisted companies to implement adapted International Financial Reporting Standards in 
Portugal. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 21, 169 – 184.  
Guler, I., Guillen, M., Macpherson, J., 2002. Global competition, institutions, and the diffusion 
of organizational practices: The international spread of ISO 9000 quality certiﬁcates. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 47, 207–232.  
Hassan, M., 2008. The development of accounting regulations in Egypt. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 23, 467-484. 
Irvine H.J., 2008. The global institutionalization of financial reporting: The case of the United 
Arab Emirates, Accounting Forum 32 (2), 125-142. 
Lounsbury, M., 2007. A tale of two cities: Competing logics and practice variation in the 
professionalizing of mutual funds. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 289–307. 
Lounsbury, M., 2008. Institutional rationality and practice variation: New directions in the 
institutional analysis of practice. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33, 349–361. 
22 
 
Maguire, S., Hardy, C., Lawrence, T.B., 2004. Institutional entrepreneurship in emerging fields: 
HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada. Academy of Management Journal, 47 (5), 657–
679. 
Marquis, C., Lounsbury, M., 2007. Vive la résistance: Competing logics and the consolidation of 
U.S. community banking. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 799–820. 
Miller, P., 1994. Accounting as a social and institutional practice: an introduction, In A.G. 
Hopwood and P. Miller (Eds.) Accounting as Social and Institutional Practice (pp. 1-39), 
Cambridge: University Press. 
Miller, P., Napier, C., 1993. Genealogies of calculation. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
18(7/8), 631-647.  
Murro, E.V.B., Munhoz, T.R., Teixeira, G.B., Lourenço, I., 2015. The impact of the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in the fees of auditing in companies of BM&F Bovespa. In Lourenço, I., 
Major, M.J., Standardization of Financial Reporting and Accounting in Latin American 
Countries, Chapter 8. Hershey: IGI Global. 
Nakasone, G., 2015. Accounting standards in Peru: Issues and challenges. In Lourenço, I. and 
Major, M.J. Standardization of Financial Reporting and Accounting in Latin American 
Countries. Hershey: IGI Global.  
Nor-Aziah, A.K., Scapens, R.W, 2007. Corporatisation and accounting change: The role of 
accounting and accountants in a Malaysian public utility. Management Accounting 
Research 18 (2), 209-247. 
Oliver, C., 1992. The antecedents of deinstitutionalization. Organization Studies, 13, 563–588. 
Orton, J.D., Weick, K.E., 1990. Loosely coupled systems: a reconceptualization. Academy of 
Management Review, 15, 203–223. 
Patton, M.Q., 2002. Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods. California, USA: Sage. 
Radebaugh, L., Gray, S., Black, E., 2006. International Accounting and Multinational Enterprises. 
New York, NY: Wiley. 
Rathkte, A., Santana, V., 2015. Has IFRS improved comparability regarding earnings 
management in Latin America? In Lourenço, I. and Major, M.J. Standardization of 
Financial Reporting and Accounting in Latin American Countries. Hershey: IGI Global. 
Rodrigues, L.L., Craig, R., 2007. Assessing international accounting harmonization using 
Hegelian dialectic, isomorphism and Foucault. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 18 (6), 
739-757. 
Rodríguez García, M.d.P., Alejandro, K.A.C., Sáenz, A.B.M., Sánchez, H.H.G., 2017. Does an IFRS 
adoption increase value relevance and earnings timeliness in Latin America? Emerging 
Markets Review, 30, 155-168.  
Ryan, B., Scapens, R., Theobald, M., 2002. Research Method and Methodology in Finance and 
Accounting. London, UK: Thompson. 
Sarquis, R.W., Luccas, R.G., Lourenço, I., 2014. Classificação dos Sistemas Contábeis na era 
IFRS: uma análise dos países da América Latina. São Paulo. XIV Congresso USP de 
Controladoria e Contabilidade, October. 
Scott, W.R, Meyer, J.W., 1991. The Organization of Societal Sectors: Propositions and Early 
Evidence. In Powell, W.W. & DiMaggio, P.J. The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis (pp. 108-140). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
Scott, W.R., Ruef, M., Mendel, P.J., Garonna, G.A., 2000. Institutional Change and Healthcare 
Organizations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Silva, C.B.A., Madeira, G.J., Assis, J.L.F., 2004. Harmonização de normas contábeis: um estudo 
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